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China's acquisitions abroadglobal ambitions, domestic effects
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n the past year or so, the world has observed with seemiag

epidation what appears to be a new phenomenon-China's
' ,r;
"stepping out" into the world economy. Tbi. move, labeled the
,:i? "Going Out Strategy"by Chinese policy makers, sees China
.d
acting in the world not just as a trader of commodities and raw
:materials, or the provider of inexpensively-producedconsumer
1'1 goods for every corner of the globe, bat as a driven and sophla",:; ticated acquirer of foreign assets and the equity inin the
,'-I legal entities that control such assets. The Newkker magazine,
.I ' ,
- ever topical and appropriately humorous, highlighted t
his
I I
attention with a cartoon in its October 17,2005 edition.That
drawing shows two prosperous and no doubt Upper East Side- dwelling matrons holding cocktails before a fireplace. Above
the fireplace hangs the formal portrait of a balding, well-fed,
I
elderly, man. Looking at the portrait, one lady says matterof-fady to the other: "That's Karl, before he wm purchased by the
;r.
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The ChlOOC Md for U n o d
concern, and Yhe slightly nervous humor it engendered,
- wasThis
idlamed by a Chinese oil company's summer bid for the
control of an iconic American oil company, in direct competition with a US. oil company suitor.That transaction was of
course the Hong Kong-domiciled and listed China National
Offshore Oil Corporation Ltd.'s (CNOOC Ltd.) June 2005
all-cash US$18,5 billion bid for Unocal of California--at a more
tkan 10 percent premium tij Chevron's competing stock and
cash deal, already the subject of a bindiinglrnergeragreement.
The anxiety-t
least as articulated in the press, the U.S.
Congress, @d at aaxious hearings in Washington-focwed on
an eclectic but eye-catching range of issues. Some tlwndered
grave warnings about the threat to America5 hational security''
genedyband U. S. "ene@y security" specifidly (meaning
U.S. access to' iwos1dwide hydrocarlson pmduction-andcontrol
of downetream refining, supply, and distribution); others
worried vaguely about the transaaion as a harbinger of China's
increasing economic, political, a
d military influence; still

I

dthers pointad to the phenomenon of a long-feared
he." udog Gmmunist-Ld government funds to finance am all Earh
ded to better the American champion's cash and stock of5er.
This latter characterization waa heled by the prospect of huge
b o r x w w i u ~ h a p as third of the cash offer-from a ccmsmti- of banks led by the industrial and C o m m e d B d of
China (ICBC), a People's Republic of C P (PRC) state-med
commercial bank, and from the CNOOC Ld's 70 percent
shareholder, state-owned, and PRC-domiciled China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). StiIl others, ~ s h a p s
trade lawyers sensing a rhetorical or business opportunity,
went so far as to cry foul under the WorldZiade Opmzation
(WTO) accession deal which China completed in November
2001-labeling the proposed financing of the Unocal bid as a
breach of WTO prohibitions against state subsidies, and thus
actionable under the WTO (and the separate China-specific)
couatervaihg duties regime.
In a Werent environment, each of these points could have
been rebutted fairly easily. The worry about the "takeaver" of
a U.S. oil company might have been answered by pointing out
that more than 70 percent of Unocal's petroleum production,
and more than 75 percent of its petroleum reserves, remain
outside ofthe Umizd Stutes (ironically, w s d y in Asia), and all of
the Unocal production is promised to various foreign buyers
(again, primarily Asian buyers) under long-term production sharing or production sales contracts. (In fact, Unocal's
worldwide oil and natural gas production represented only a
measly one percent of entire U.S. consumption.) For dawnstream
assets (refining, pipelines, distribution, and retail)-where
control issues become masginally more relevant-Unocal has
no downstream assets whatsoever in the United States (having
sold them almost a decade ago). The attack which portrayed
CNOOC's soft or government-providedfinancing as an i l l e g
subsidy was a stretch from any honest international trade
lawyer's standpoint, as nothing about the proposed CNOOC
acquisition, and its financing violatedWTO rules on tmde (not

investment)-related subdies, or the PRC's specific d t P
men& upon its accession to the WTO, or under trade-related
investment measurea (TRIMS) norms. The facw on Chin+e
providers of finance, whetber state run b&, or the 70 percent
state-owned shareholder of the bidder, somehow unifarmly
failed to identi5 the critical bridge financing provided by such
all-American financial institutions as Gohiman Sachs and JP
Morgan, to be refinanced with CNOOC with debt h a n c e s
(and signiscant m d m fees for the seme financiers) soon
after completion of the deal: Clearly something else, something
rather pernicious, was at work given the hastile reception that
greeted CNOOC's effort to act on the world stage.

The -/arawng cy"China &nY playing by the rules!"
The CNOOC bid for Unocal also gave renewed voice to
what already seems a tired refrain: "China doesn't play by the
rules." Peter Robinson, the vice chairman of Chevron who
led the public relations effort for the CNOOC competitor,
remained "on [this] message." Whereas formerly the refrain
had been heard on international trade matters and intellectual property rights protection and enforcement, it was now
suddenly part of a heated chorus framing the far more sensitive
sphere of cross-border acquisitions of controlling interests in
U. S. -domiciled mega-corporations.
The truth is that the CMOOC bid signaled something rather
different, and given China's reforms over the past two decades,
something more profound. Not only did the CNOOC effort
represent another sigrufcant step in China's complex and
broad-ranging interaction with the world generally, but far
more critically, it signaled a striking new phase of the PRC's
behavior-changing entanglement with foreign and international
legal, commercial, and governance norms, all with dinct reform
effects inside China. Thus, the CNOOC bid implicated precisely
the opposite of a critique which accuses the PRC of 'hot playing
by the rules." With the Unocal bid, China, its government, and
various Chinese commercial instruments were forced for the
first time to take cognizance of, and play by, internationallyaccepted rules--not merely ip their business operations and
external contracting, public disclosure, accounting practices, or
the conventions of international M&A, but even with respect to
internal corporate governance at the firms themselves. In this
way, we might see China's new acquisition activity outside of its
borders rather more grandly-as an important mechanism for

the encounter with, and absorption of, bedrocklvle ot
concepts and practices.

American per)creptCons of CMna and -the Chhresa,
Chinese
af f~lla&nc%p3tal in China
In the 19=
journalist and historian Harold Isaacs
an important book on American perceptions of China
and India titled Scmtches On Our Minds.The book synthesized
the results Bf numerous surveys of Americans with respect to
common ideas of those two great civilizations. Importantly, the
surveys were directed to an "elite" population-in~mericadiplomats, academics, well-traveled writers and intellectuals, ,
'1 '
and multinational business leaders. Isaacs' idea was that!thk
perceptions of this group were in some ways more iip&rtant
than those of the ~ m e r i c"ie v e r y r n ~ . ~ ~ the
~ i ~elite
s t , group \ \
had in many ways encountered the reality of China and India,
and might be thought to have realistic, nuanced impressions
arising from such experience. Second, such~ersons
would
-by virtue of their leadership positions=-have an ongoing
involvement in dealings with those sokieties and making or
implementing U.S. policy towards China and India. Isaacs'
s d conclusion was that even these notionally well-educated,
informed, and experienced policy makers and leaders operated
with heads literally stuffed iyith damaging and siniplistic clichCs
about China and India. In the Chinese case, these deep-seated
attitudes swung between wildly divergent images of the "good"
and "bad" Chinese, Ath no nuanced middle ground. On the
good side: Pearl Buck's oq-the-wp ~kistians,or cheerful,
diligent, poor, innocent, peasants, and Charlie Chan-benign,
humble, problem-solving,intelligent, and deferential; on the
bad side, the diabolical, mysterious, shadowy, cannibalistic,
sinister, Dr. Fu Manchu, or, collectively, the rampaging hordes
constituting a "Yellow Peril" threatening to swamp and overrun American "civilization,"or at least the American order.
While the dichotomy that Isaacs identified may seem absurd or
anachronistically racist in what we assure ourselves is a more
enlightenedage, it does seem to track nicely the dizzying swings
in U.S. perceptions over the three decades between President
Nixon's visits to Beijing and Shanghai in 1972, and current ideas
about China as a distinct military, economic (commercial),
and ideological "threat" or "strategic competitor." It does not
seem an exaggeration to identify these deeply-ingrained and
easily processed ideas as one set of views informing American
approaches to China's accelerating investigation of overseas
acquisitions.

.

T'nhg the mirror, we might also point out &t Chinese
e l i ~have
s long had equally negative perceptions of foreign
(and particularly Western) involvement in China-politically,
ditarily, and of course commercially. This is a very long stay,
not emily elaborated in this ldnd of presentation. SufKce to
say that this &wed attitude was (and is) determined equally
by xenophobia and the bitter experience of Western incursions into Qing Dynasty China from the early 19th ten*, .
and through the OpiumWars and the "unequal treaties" which
pried treaty ports and sovereignty over Hong Kong Island from
China, which in turn served in large measure to de-legitimize
and topple the last Imperial dynasty. Even people in China who
regret the abuses and chaos of the Maoist era approve of how
the Communist victory in 1948-49 forced out of China the
"imperialist-coloniali~t"
powers, the United States included. So
it is not surprising then that on the eve of China's 1979 historychanging "Reform &ia Opening to the OutsideWorld" strategy,
China's premier foreign language propaganda organ would
proclaim: "We do not allowforeign capital to eKploit China2 resources
nor do we run joint enterprises withforeign enterprises, still Iess beg
themforforeign loans" (from a 1977 Beijing Review). And yet,

even before this statement was contradicted by thousands of
Sino-foreign joint venfures, and China's rise to the status as the
World Bank's largest borrower, there was an exception. Chinese
policy makers had in fact started very early in the 1970s to set
the groundwork for cooperation with foreign oil companies.
This cooperation, focusing on hard-to-exploit "offshore" oil and
gas fields (i.e., within China's sovereign seas, but not onshore or
-. dry land), started in the late 1970s, yet only after very sign&cant Chinese internal disputes about a potential loss of sovereignty¶China's control of a strategic energy assets, and hidden
foreign agendas seeking economic and political (and military)
control. In fact, Chinese Communist Party elites in 1977 were
saying exactly the same things about foreign participation in
Chinese oil and gas production sharing arrangements as Senator
Chuck Schumer, Chevron, and a large part of the U.S. House of
Representatives were saying about a Chinese company's bid for
control of Ulocal almost three decades later. That is one irony
revealed in this particular corner of history; the other is that the
commercial entity the Chinese government set up to bargain
with and enter into production sharing contracts with the likes
of Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, and others for the exploration,
development, and production of these Chinese offshore oil and
gas resources was none other than the China National Offshore
Oil Corporation, then as now known by its acronym, CNOOC.

-n

o

t

~

~

w

k

i

t

Some of the uglier visions conjured by the Isaaca survey
in the 1950s seem to have been reanimated in 2004-05 by
the spectacle of China's global ambitions. For Americans of a
certain age, the present climate r e d l s U.S. attitudes towards
Japanese ambitions in the late 1970s and early 1 9 8 0 which
~~
were hostile even though Japan was a political and military d y
for the United States.The signal transaction in those days was
the acquisition by Japanese interests of an American iconRockefeller Center in NewYork City (perhaps closely followed
by the Japanese takeover of the most American of businesses
-Hollywood's Columbia Pictures.) Today, Chinese companies
also seem to be chasing America's icons, with the ready help of
America's own financial institutions acting as lenders, bridge
lenders, or private equity co-investors. At the same time, many
American companies, iconic or not, are actively seeking to be
bailed out by Chinese capital-another interesting and ironic
reversal on China's own use of foreign multinationals to h c e
or save bankrupt state-owned enterprises in China in the very
earliest days of the Chinese reform. And what icons they are:
CNOOC's bid for Unocal, one of the original Standard Oil
petroleum companies (the Rockefellers again); Shandong
Hai'er's USS2.5 billion bid for Maytag (the defenseless Maytag
repairman);Beijing Lenovo's US $1.75 billion acquisition of
,IBM's personal computer business (for Wolverine fans, a lesser
"Blue"). And the falling "icons" are not only American. In recent
years, the world has witnessed other developed economy
properties coming under PRC control:TCL's acquisition of
Thomson France'sTV business (RCA);Shanghai Automotive's
purchase of Korea's number four auto-maker (Ssarqyong
Motors); the Minmetals bid to take over Canada's Noranda
(also owner of Falconbridge); Nanjing Auto's takeover of the
MG Rover assets in the United Kingdom; HuaweiTechnology
of Shenzhen's stalking of Marconi. . . .The list seems to goes on
and on, and worryingly for some outside China, seems to get
longer.

Haw we got here from there
These acquisitions of iconic foreign industrial properties are
in fact the culmination of a 25-year process of investment and
financing-related interaction between China and the outside
world. China's "Reform and Opening to the Outside World"
policy of the late 1970s featured, among other things, domestic
economic reform (and the slow march to a semi-marketized

~

economy), construction of a legal system @mmdgati
substantive law and r m e r y of legal instituticm), increased
trade with foreign natians, and the attraction of foreign sect
investment (FDI) into the PRC.
At least fi.0111
the Chinese side, FDI , was understood from
its earliest days as a way to attraot hard currency financing
for China's bankrupt state-owned or conkrolled assets, and
gain additional benefits like foreign technology, madagement
how-how, *ibution
and m a r k h g s m , and fordgn sales
channels for hard currency-earning exports. Fareign capjza
seemed happy to do its part, by donating capitd, technology,
and management expertise into China, all for a chance
--however tightly restricted--at the rumored nirvana of one
billion Chinese consumers. Regardless of the motivatrons
on either side of the equation, the FDI program did serve as
the exclusive vehicle for early introduction of great areas of
commercial, corporate, and financial law into China, including
items as basic as corporate legal personality, transferable
equity interests, separation of owners and management (and in
management, between a board and an executive corps), and a
market for equity interests in enterprises.
In the early 1990s, China began to look to another
mechanism to raise finance for the same moribund state assets
-the domestic and then international capital markets. These
ambitions spurred "corporatizationnof asset groupings in China,
and the issuance of stock by such new corporations to both
domestic and foreign investors buying on China's new stock
exchanges, and very q a y , foreign investors buying on foreign
e x c h a n g e d Hong Kong, then NewYork, then London, then
Tokyo, and so on. Overall, this second interaction with the
international capital markets-again, featuring Chinese issuers
raising funds from foreign capital providers-proved beneficial
for Chinese commercial legal developments, by introducing
foreign securities laws and exchange regulation, a new world
of disclosure and legal eriforcement (both administrative and
through private rights of action), international accounting
standards, and internal governance requirements.
And yet, even as China saw the establishment of ever .greater
numbers of in-country FDI prLjects, or listings of China- or
Hong Kong-domiciled issuers on the NewYork Stock Exchange
(NYSE)via Securities and Exchange Commission-registered
offerings, the Chinese government proved positively shy in
calling Chinese enterprises to fuW their destiny outside of the
embrace of the PRC--allowing only tentative forays first into
Hong Kong, and then in Southeast Asia. While large Chinese

almost
= o m p a used to fdliaw ajmple
trding activities,,yvi&f~rkjgnpurchasers or andora. n a t
situation changed radically in the late 1990s, when individual
~hiheseenterprises-ome
old-style state-owned or controll
actors, others fiercely independent Chinese campanies-begm
to look actively for investment deals abroad, a set of ambitions
only subsequently sanctioned and supported by central policy
makers under the sotcalled "Going Out" strategy. It is again
beyond the scope of this presentation to speculate in detail
on what is behind the now acknowledged fact of the ''~bink
Outnstrategy, or what high policy aims call for its rhetorical '
support by the central government. Qere, one might point to
the need of these companies to procure stable access to certain
kinds of resources, and/or technology. Other, more manufacturing oriented companies are clearly after E e i g n distribution channels and thus access to foreipmarkets, better profit
margins in better-developed product markets, and use of established "global" brand names. And certainly many bold and rather
far-seeing Chinese managers believe they need to "Go Out"
to test and strengthen their companies in a truly competitive,
and global market, far removed from the cozy mokopoly-based
market that remains a substantial part of China's industrial
economy.
For present purpdses, it is moat important to recognize that
the "Going Outnstrategy is in most cases being led by Chinese
enterprises themselves, rather than the central government.
(For instance, in late 2005, it was revealed that the CNOOC
bid for Unocal was undertaken almost entirely at the initiative of CNOOC, and over the fierce objections and stubborn
hesitations of PRC central government actors.This may have
lulled CNOOC executives [and their advisors] into a false sense
of achievement. Perhaps they thought if they had managed
to convince their political masters to allow them to proceed
with the bid, it would be so much easier to convince Unocal
shareholders to accept the higher price offered.) In addition,
the Chinese government has in the last two years also created
or ameliorated the legal basis for such outbound investment
activity, and thus conformed the law (or removed legal restrictions) which had previously worked ta restrain such activity.
(Here, most of the restrictions were sourced in foreign
exchange regulation and government permiasions for offshore
holdings.) Most important, this outbound ~ u s h
has caused the
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i&larch29-36two-day meeting of CNOOC Ltd. b o d ;

Un-1
is "shopped"-discussions with both
_
ChevronandCNOOC;
. ,
December 2 L U n c a l and CNOOC Chairman meet to
discuss a possible deal (CNOOC Ltd. board na,+yised of
the meeting);
. . ,.
,

foreign, non-executive, directors are informed of a potential
bid for the first time, and vote to block CNOOC Ltd. bid;
-r
CNOOC signals to Unocal that a bid will not be forthcoming
on March 30;
0 March 3 L U n o c a l board, upon receiving Chevron5 revised
. -.
offer of March 29, decides to terminate negotiations with
. .; 8005
. . -;-,;*
- >'
ENI, and gives CNOOC until April 2 to make m offer;
January& b c i d firnureports t h a t - c ~ ~ oconsidc
March 31--CNOOC Ltd. board meets, but is still unable to
%' - -.ering m a g a bid for Unocral; Los A n g b Times repm a
agree on the mmlung of sn offer, or n price; one foreign, nonCWDUC bid af US$13 billion;
executive, director r e s i p for "health reasons";
e J m u a r y &Chevron delivers a letter to U n o d Lindicating
April 1-CNOOC board in disarray, not even able to
strong ihterest in purchasing b K d ;
'
.
convene a board meeting;
J Jzmuary-early F e i p a a r y - C N O O C lobbies PRC govep- April
1-the day before m anticipated bid horn CNOOC
meat departmengin prepktratiq, for a possible bid fpr
. . .
*
Ltd.,Chevron agrees to sweeten its bid again, by giving
-. - LIma3.;
Unocal shareholders a choice of an d share deal, cash and
9 Fehuary ZkChevron%initial bid: all share de$. 0,94
share deal, or all cash deal: (i) 0.7725 Chevron shares plus
Chevron shares for each share of Unocal;
US$16.25 for each Unocal share; (ii) 1.OS Chevron shares for
8 February 2 C U n o c a l board determines that Chevron's
; 7;each U n o d share; or (iii) US$65.00 per Unocal share;
< .
offer is insUmcient; ,
,
.'
is.:- April 2-Unocll board meets, decides to make a final
M u c h l - ~ m & k ~ o & e s Chevron h a t the February 26
dedsion on April 3;
+,;;..
Chevron hid is refkid;
April 3--CNOOC Ltd. board meets again, but is still unable
: 0 March I-Un-1
in contact with CNOOC and EN1 ftaly)
to make rn offer;
as alternative bidders, and gives each until March 7 to offer a
April 1 U n o c a l and C h o n sign a definitive merger
price; :
,
,agreement for combined wh/stock deal with Unocd, at
~ u c 7-CNOOC
h
Ltd. communicates preliminary bid
value of US$60.65 per &are (US$16.5 billion) (this indudes
rage of USS59.00-62.00per U n d A m (USS16.0-16.8 ' '
aforce-*e-Mte"
clause
ar ac9uirercan force Und
billion)-immdately rejected by Unacal;
board to put the Chevron bid to a Unoml shareholder vote]
Mmck 29-Chevron raises its February 26 bid 10 percent
and US$500million '%re& up" fee).
--still an all share deal, 1.03 Chevron shares for each share of
Unacal;
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full range of Chinese actors-from government departments to
enterprises to individual managers and investors-to encounter
a whole menu of laws, regulations, institutions, customs,
and more, that govern and shape investment and commercial
activity in political economies outside of China.

bid far Unocal during th,es m e r of 2005.As it developed,
the pmped trimsation involved CNOOC Ltd.-the Hong
Kong-doded, 70 percent-wotra~ed,subsidivy of Beije's
purely state-owned enterprise, ChinaNational O a o r e 011
Corpontion w aCNOOC"-md&g
d cad bid for Un~cal,
b t bid supported by pmposcd finmhg of mom than US$7
billion f i ~ m
CNOOC (to be mapped for h s in CNOOC
Ltd. witbin twD yews) sod W$6billion fPam s sydcate led by

I

the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), but vgith
JP Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs participating with bridge
financing (to be taken out with the issuance of debt by CNOOC
Ltd. after completion of the acquisition of Unocal).
The major points tirneline for the rise and fa1 of CNOOC's
efforts may be recited as follows: At the end of 2004, Unocal
was being "shopped" in America and internationally. In
December of 2004, CNOOC was approached by Unocal, with
Unocal executives asking CNOOC if the Chinese company
would be interested in acquiring the American company. At
the beginning of 2005, the Financial Times reported (falsely as
it turned out) an imminent bid for Unocal from CNOOC.
This, perhaps by design, conjured an immediate indication
of "strong interest" from Chevron on January 6, and then a
formal all stock bid from Chevron on February 26, valuing
Unocd at over US116 billion. All through this period, and
then March, CNOOC was not able to make a bid-the bid
requested ofit by Unocd-because independent directors on
the board of CNOOC Ltd. could not be pehaded to vote in
favor of such an action. (Their formally articulated concerns
focused on the crushing debt load CNOOC Ltd. would have
to take on to complete the purchase, and the hugely dilutive
effects for non-CNOOC shareholders of future, necessary,
issuances of stock by CNOOC Hang Kong. These outside
directors may in truth have been alienated by the way in which
the proposal was brought to them by CNOOC executives and
CNOOC Ltd. executive board members at the last minute,
and seeking a "rubber stamp.") Insiders also report real battles
between CNOOC executives and the highest-level Chinese
central government actors, many fiercely opposed to the
proposed takeover bid by a Chinese company for an American
oil company. Unocal finally gave CNOOC Ltd. until April 2
to post a bid, which caused Chevron to raise its own offer on
April 1. CNOO C Ltd. remained styrmed at the board level,
and thus with no Chinese bid forthcoming over the night of
April 2- 3, Unocal signed a binding merger agreement with
Chevron on April 3,2005, valuing Unocal at approximately
US$16.5 billion. In an example of skilled lawyering, the
Chevron lawyers included in h e merger agreement a "force the
vote" clause, which contractually obligated Unocal, at Chevron's
drection, to convene a shareholders' meeting to approve the sale
to Chevron. (This made the Chevron strategy going forward
rather s i m p l e i f and when a competing Chinese bid was
forthcoming, Chevron needed only to introduce doubt into
the minds of Unocal shareholders about eventual U.S. govern-

Revised contest
GNOOG lv945Wm iks fray

+ June I--%

-

Chengp, Chairmadl of CNOOC and
CNQOC Ltd.,works to convince CNOOC Ltd. board that
CB00C Ltd. should make offer for ~ d ;
June I&U. s . Federal Trade Commission raises no
abjection to Chewon-Unocalmerger;
d Early June-Continued resistance on CWOOC Ltd.
board fmm foreign-dtiza independent directors-they3!
,
articulate concern about the mushing debt load CNOOG.5:
Ltd. would haw, and the diiutive impact on minority share: 4;
'k
halders;, eta ;
..
June 22-CNOOC Ltd. board votes unanimously to
- d
e bid (Golban Sahs-employed independent director I
abstaining to mdd "ro&ct of interest");
9 J&xe 2H----C1\50QC Ltd. makes bid for UnocdY+
-,,
US467.W per share ax- US$18.S 'bibon, all cash (1 1
percent higher than Chewon's signed ZISS16.5 billion
I
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afiet-1;

6 June22-mitt Jtaly-CNOOC ttd. md Unocal negotiate
&aft Merger Agreement in NewYork;
June 24-41 members OFUS.Congress s a d letter ta
President Bush urging a "thoraugh review" of the CNOOC
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C -June30--U. S. Home of Representatives votes 333- - 92 to bar the U.S. Treanuy From using any of its funds
ta 'meommend approvalud the CNOOC Ltd. bid per
.
the
CAUS pm-;
and 398-15 non-binding resolu:
1'' ; tim, expresz$ng coneern b
t tbre CNOOC Ltd. bid, if
emplaed, could'heat~n to impair wtiona1 securityw
.
(CEIpS stm&rd);
'
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Securities and Exchange Commission
approves pmxg a d tender dfer materials for & m n -

Unaml deal;
.
July 1-CNOOC Ltd. makes pre-cmptive request of
CRIB to cornmewe lnvestigatio~of announced CNOOC ,

ment approval, force a shareholders' meeting, and allow the
Unocal shareholders to approve the bird in hand (Chevron's
lower-priced deal) over a possibly unstable but richer option
[CNOOC's higher bid] .) Soon thereafter, the shareholders'
meeting required under the governing merger agreement was
set for later in the same summer-August 10,2005.
More than two months later, CNOOC management finally
cajoled the dissenting CNOOC Ltd. board members into place,

%

-

a Mid-JuSy-PEh C-J
PRC might
the Wtd

2%~

and on June32CNOOC Ltd.announced a much higher bid for
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(CFIUS), the U.S. government interagency group tasked with
analyzing foreign bids for American assets or equity interests
under Exon-Florio. (If Unocal shareholders were permitted
to believe that the acquisition would be approved by the U.S.
government, they would likely have rejected the lower Chevron
bid to take more value [and all in cash] under the CNOOC
offer.) Those hopes were dashed when, on July 7, the Bush
administration's National Security Advisor let it be known

Unocal directors were still required to fulfill their fiduciary
to recommend either the agreed Chevron deal or the higher
CNOOC bid, but asked CNOOC for its final "best offer." That
was forthcoming a day later, when CNOOC raised its bid to
US$69.00 per share. Three days later, Chevron raised its own
agreed offer---albeit to a level still lower than the Chinese bid,
China and "China threat" rhetoric in the American Congress
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grew almost unbearably over-heated, with several legislators
introducing bills specifically targeting CNOOC's proposed
acquisition of a U.S. energy company. CNOOC decision
makers saw that no bid hom a Chinese company, no matter
how stable, or how rich, would be allowed to pass over the
sigdicant political hurdles now in place. Accordingly, CNOOC
formally withdrew its offer for Unocal on August 2,2005. On
Unocal with Chevron.

child of enmeshment with W e r u k m
many ways, the critiques and fear-mongering targeted
n CNOOC proved almost cruelly ironic. For CNOOC is
ot the mere agent of a newly rapacious Chinese superpower,

plemented notions of transparency, disclosure, and internal

observers simply must differentiate between the origins
and control of the Chinese players now stepping onto the world
For instance, Lenovo, which acquired IBM's PC business
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acted to facilitate capital accumulation and irivestment, and
foregone some tax revenues in exchange for a small equity
interest, but not kept a strong hand in the running of what is an
entrepreneurial business controlled by a charismatic individual.
(This of course is not to say that all PRC entities identified as
"state-owned" are innocent of state or government control
-MinMetals, the proposed acquirp of Noranda in Canada, is

in fact a direct creation [as the name indicates] of the former
Ministry of Metallurgy.)
Each of these examples should prod us to,examine closely
the genesis and nature of Chinese enterprises increasingly active
on a global scale, such as CNOOC specifically. Far if CNOOC
is representative of anydung, it is for identification of domestic
and internal firm effects arising from China's or "China 1nc.i"
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participation in the global economy and commercial legal
order. CNOOC's path is emblematic of the path future Chinese
enterprises will walk as they truly "Go Out" into the world
-first, developing their business in an increasingly marketized
domestic economy functioning under law; then, after corporatizition, pursuing business activities under a host of objectively-rendered commercial, legal, financial, and corporate
governance constraints; then raising capital on developed
overseas capital markets and encountering the sigzllficant
demands of foreign securities and exchange regulation; and
finally, in the process of making offers for public and private
foreign companies, working with and being shaped by a wholly
ditrerent legal, contractual, and regulatory context, from the
negotiation of sophisticated acquisition agreements (enforceable before courts or arbitral bodies) to the complete range of
takeover regulation and proxy rules. In addition, there will no
doubt be serious and sustained enmeshment with other regulatory systems if and when Chinese companies are successful in
gaining control of foreign industrial propertieefor example,
other than ongoing corporate disclosure and securities regulation (in the post Sarbanes-Oxley [SOX] United States, increasingly pertaining to internal firm governance), environmental,
occupational health and safety, labor, pension, etc. stipulations.
(Consider the experience of Lenovo as it moved its headquarters to the United States, and suddenly found its operations and
work force largely subject to a whole nest of foreign laws and
regulations.)
The CNOOC case specifically is highly instructive. CNOOC
was conceived in the late 19709, and formally established in
the early 1980s, as a corporate representative of the sovereign,
or the People's Republic of China. (This happened even before
there was a corporate law in China, much less a law formally
governing state-owned enterprises [or "enterprises owned
by all the people'?.) Having made the politically sensitive
decision to invite foreign oil companies into commercial
production sharing arrangements to explore, develop, and
hopehrlly produce from China's then untapped offshore oil
and gas resources, China needed to create, from whole cloth,
an entity which could sign production sharing contracts with
interested foreign concerns. CNOOC was thus established,
given franchise rights over exploration areas (and contract
blocks within those areas), and commenced accepting bids

from foreign parties for the negotiation and implementation
of such production sharing arrangements. (Distinguishthe '
other twa large national oil companies from the PRC: China
National Petroleum Corporation [CNPC], now known as
I
~ e t r o ~ h i nwas
i , effectively the encapsulation of the ''upstream:
onshore-focused,liqe ministry, the h e t r y sf Petroleum
I
Industry; Sinopec, the other major Chinese oil company,
was the monopoly participant in all "downstream" acti9tiq.
A reorganization in the late 1990s saw CNPC and Sinopec
swapping some [onshore] upstream and downstream assets,
\\
while CNOOC aggressively developed greenfield downstream
projects but gave up none of its offshore p r o d u ~ o nsharing
contracts entered into with foreign concer@.0ver more than
two decades of work, CNOOC concluded
r a large number of
production sharing deals, entered into with some of the world's
most sophisticated oil and gas companies, all focused on finding
and extracting hydrocarbons from offshore blocks. In those
two decades, many saw CNOOC as the exemplar of a new
k i d of Chinese concern-dmittedly
a corporate front for
the state, but forced to enter into detailed production sharing
contracts (subject to binding international arbitration) modeled
closely on contractual forms used by Indonesia and Brazil, with
key input from Norway's national oil aompany. (CNPC, the
state-owned enterprise successor to the Ministry of Petroleum
Industry, was never forced to do this in its upstream work, and
was only permitted to enter into production sharing contracts
with foreign oilers in 1994.)While a step forward for the introduction of law and legal instruments into the basic life of one
of China's largest concerns, many of these facially sophisticated
contracts were not subject to a great deal of negotiation (except,
for a narrow set of comm&rcialterms, and the negotiable
"X factor" which divided up production based on different
volumes achieved).And yet, these contracts did provide, for the
first time in reform-era China, extremely detailed contractual
arrangements governing a joint project's exploration, development, and production phases, sophisticated tracking of expenses
and investment to effect cost and then investment recovery, and
allocation of revenue sharing (after investment and cost recoveries were fully paid out) very similar to the "waterfalls" seen in
U. S.-style partnership agreements. Moreover, these relationships between CNOOC and foreign oilers were implemented
as commercial contracts subject to binding dispute resolution
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(as opposed to state-to-8tat.e relatiomhips or bureaucratic
co-mds),
d were (and are) actually contested in sweral
arbitrations or threaten~darbitrations over the years.
CNO0C's second major brush with law, and markets
operating under some kind of rule of law, was the listing on
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange of a newly-created and 70
percent-owned sub~idiary-CNOOC Ltd., the summer 2005
suitor for Unocal. (The benefit of many of the better production sharing contracts originally entered into by CNOOC with
foreign companies was assigned to this Hong Kong-domiciled
listing vehicle.) That phenomenon left CNOOC, qua the
representative of the PRC on numerous production sharing
contracts, learning many of the same hard lessons absorbed by
other Chinese state-owned firms seeking finance in developed
capital markets. CNOOC went through a difficult period of
corporate reorganization, property (contract) rights transfers,
and abundant public disclosure, all in the service of capital
raising from mostly foreign investors (granted relatively little
governance power in exchange for their share investment). The
process even allowed CNOOC to encounter the fickle capital
markets, with CNOOC Ltd.'s first attempt at an IPO in 1999
pulled back at the last minute and then re-launched in 20Q1.
Some may object to any portrayal of the 2001 CNOOC
Ltd. listing in Hong Kong as progress in the terms argued here,
pointing to the unhealthy phenomenon of an entirely dominated
listing subsidiary, and a 30 percent body of passive and disempowered public shareholders positioned alongside an unconstrained and 70 percent controlling (Chinese state) shareholder.
This would be wrong, as it fails to take account of the Hong
Kong, U.S. and NYSE securities and exchange law and regulation which immediately impacted CNOOC Ltd.$ internal
governance (especially after the passage of SOX), the real
rights of minority shareholders under those external regulatory
systems, and transactional rules which call for disinterested
director or shareholder votes, exchange approvals, or the like,
prior to implementation.Again, realists might see shareholder
votes mandated at any 70 percent single shareholder-cantrolled
company as an empty formality. CNOOC itself disproved this
view when in 2004 another of its Hong Kong-listed subsidiaries
-China Oilfield Services 1nc.-was blocked from diverting
40 percent of its US$148 million revenue to another CNOOCcontrolled PRC-domiciled finance entity. Sixty-threepercent

of the China Oilfield Services Inc. shareholders voted to block
the diversion of h d s from one CNOOC subsidiary to another,
&at shareholder vote being required by Hong Kong Stock
Exchange rules. (It is fascinating to see these same transactional rules, many of which limit the opportunism of controlling shareholders, subsequently imported directly into the
domestic Chinese legal system, via China Securities Regdatory
Commission and Shanghai Exchange regulation.)
Aspects of the U n o d bid experience itself support the idea
that CNOOC and its top management, in seelung to act outside
of China, encountered serious constraints on their behavior
that they would never have faced were CNOOC acting as a
large SOE in a purely Chinese context. CNOOC was forced to
engage directly with accepted or mandated corporate governance norms and rules designed to protect real (and minority)
shareholders. It is now known that CNOOC executives were
intent on having CNOOC Ltd. launch a bid for Unocal in
the early part of 2005, but that the transaction was frustrated
solely due to the opposition of at least one and perhaps several
independent (and all foreign national) board members at the
CNOOC Ltd. level. (While various rationales are rumored for
the objections, suflice to say that the non-executive CNOOC
board members may have harbored resentments over the
way in which the parent company and its leaders went to the
full CNOOC Ltd. board at the very last minute as a 'kubber
stamp.") Observers outside China must recognize what a
profound difference this represents: When previously would any
Chinese state-run giant, even if "corporatized" (or "refomed'*
into a corporation with a board of directors, executive management, shareholders, etc.) have been constrained in any way
on a proposed acquisition, especially by board-level actors?
CNOOC Chairman Fu Chengyu, by June of 2005 forced by
his non-executive directors to delay the bid for 6 long months,
and then re-enter the battle with an offer for Unocal that was
for US$2 billion higher than the bid CNOOC might originally
have made, said tellingly, if rather wistfdly, "Our independent
directors believed they needed more time tofurther evaluate the wlue
of Unocd.This showed the good practice of corporate govanan~e.'~

Rarely in the history of China's reform has the LLgood
practice
of corporate governance" been so keenly felt--or so costly!
Even when the board of CNOOC Ltd. was finally cajoled into
launching the bid (and not without some continued resistance

from CNOOC Ltd. board members and aspects of the PRC
central government), the Hong Kong-listed company would.
have been forced to gain the approval of a s&cient number of
its public shareholders, as required under Hong Kong corporate
law and rules governing issuers listed on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange. And finally, of course, if the bid was to be allowed to
go forward, it would have had to comply with the web of U.S.
public takeover regulation, including the Williams Act (Section
14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (34 Act)) and
the tender offer rules, the notifications required under Section
13(d) of the 34 Act, continuing disclosure by the bidder and its
controlling shareholders, and been subject to the full scope of U.S.
anti-manipulation and anti-fraud rules and jurisprudence, not to
mention the rather sobering civil liability provisions implicated.
And ultimately the bid would have required approval by
a shareholders' vote of the target, Unocal, with or without
the recommendation of the Unocal board. Again, to outside
observers, this may seem to be an insigdicant process, or at
least one where Unocal shareholders could have been bribed
with an all cash Chinese offer (that "bribe" being financed,
directly and indirectly, by the PRC's treasury). Yet, that understanding does not take into account what has been business as
usual for the largest and most privileged Chinese state-owned
enterprises in the decade or so that they have grown to their
current size and ambition. Never, in the internal Chinese
domestic markets, have players of the size and influence of
a CNOOC implemented transactions (including large scale
corporate M&A or even ~ u b l i cmarkets financing transactions)
other than in accordance with the explicit command and sayso of the central government (or its line-ministries), without
any real thought of what target shareholders might think, or
public rules and regulations, much less contractual constraints,
designed to inform participants' behavior and protect owners.
By seeking to acquire the shares of Unocal, CNOOC laced
itself at the relative mercy of the many shareholders of Unocal
wh-regardless
of the relentless public relations campaigns
being fought by both CNOOC and Chevron-had real
decision-making power in respect of CNOOC's ambitions.
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CNOOC's bid for Unocal then placed "China Inc." into a brave
new world, and entangled a previously unconstrained, statecreated, oil giant in a web of laws and regulations governing
everything from internal corporate governance to external
market transactions. Whether or not people in the United

States recognize this immediate1 or understand the deep
and abiding effect such coddtrahts and proaedur&iyill have
on the behavior of Chinese corporations as they step into the
world, the fact is certain. It is for this reason that ariy late-stage
denial of a successful offer for Unocal by CFIUS in the United
II
States (were CNOOC to have gained approval of the deal at
the ~ n a c ashareholder
l
level)-n
anything other than legitimate
and wall-considered national security grounds-would
have been a
disaster for:'theongoing socialization of CNOOC and "China
Inc." An unreasoned denial by a supposedly objective ,U.S.
agency would have signaled that the laws and Fernance rules
which CNOOC and other Chinese corporate actors are just
coming to terms with do not really matter &in
thest.)le I"
of many Chinese ministries which have in the past denie'd or
limited foreign investment in China on-an entirely discretionary
(or plainly xenophobic) basis--raw political power, rhetorical
heat, and foreign "threatnconcepts rule the day That would be
a terrible lesson for China's emergent c o m p e s to learn at
this time in world history, or more importantly, from such a
teacher.
China is changing domestically, and specifically in the way it
is being governed by rule of law, as opposed to pure political
or *bureaucraticpower. Of course, much of this change is due
to organic development inside China as its economic system
comes to resemble more closely a market economy, and participants in that economy demand property and contractual rights,
and a stable legal sy&emto protect those rights. However, these
domestic legal system changes are alsdclearly due to China's
increasing involvement in the global market for ownership
interests and corporate control of industrial and service properties. Without doubt, China has worked hard over more than 20
years to implement 'legal construction" at home. However, it is
equally certain that the effect of China's "Going Out Strategy,"
and the resulting entanglement with external legal requirements and norms, is having a direct effect in binding China
and Chinese actors to radically different ways of acting inside
China-ways which affect everything from internal boardroom
dynamics, the status and powers of the previously ignored
minority shareholder, and the individual acting to protect his or
her rights "under law."
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